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I.

JURISDICTION

This is an appeal from a final judgment entered by Judge
David S. Young granting specific performance of an Earnest Money
Sales Agreement (the "Contract") between defendant/appellant
Thomas H. Schwartz ("Schwartz"), as seller, and
plaintiff/appellee C. Steven Fehlauer ("Fehlauer"), as buyer.
Trial Exhibit 12.

Appendix Tab 1.

After denying Schwartz's

motion to continue the trial to a day that Schwartz was not a
candidate in a special primary election for the Massachusetts
Legislature, the trial court conducted a bench trial without the
attendance of Schwartz.

The trial court rejected Schwartz's

defense that an express condition precedent to performance of the
Contract had not been satisfied, and entered judgment on June 16,
1994.
The trial court announced its decision in favor of Fehlauer
on May 10, 1994, and Schwartz filed his Notice of Appeal on May
26, 1994.

Record at 117.

Neither party filed post trial

motions.

This Notice of Appeal was treated as filed after entry

of the Judgment on June 16, 1994 pursuant to Rule 4(c) Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure.

Schwartz also filed a Restated Notice of

Appeal on July 6, 1994.

Record at 196.

The Supreme Court had jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1994) and assigned
the appeal to the Court of Appeals on August 16, 1994, pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (Supp. 1994).
1

II.
1.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, STANDARDS OF REVIEW
AND PRESERVATION IN TRIAL COURT
Issue for Review.

Did the trial court abuse its

discretion by conducting the trial on the same day that Schwartz
was a candidate in a primary election for the Massachusetts
Legislature?
Standard of Review.

The Court should review this issue

using an abuse of discretion standard.

Bairas v. Johnson,

13 Utah 2d 269, 373 P.2d 375, 377-78 (1962); Radcliffe v.
Akhavan. 875 P.2d 608, 610-11 (Utah Ct. App. 1994);
Preservation in Trial Court.

Schwartz filed an Objection to

Scheduling Order and Trial Setting and Motion to Continue
Trial with a supporting memorandum.

Record at 51-62.

Schwartz renewed the Objection and Motion on the day of
trial.
2.

Record at 222-236.

Issue for Review.

May an express condition precedent,

providing that the contractual obligation to sell property is
subject to the sale of another property on or before a specified
date, be satisfied by substantial performance?
Standard of Review.
correctness.

The Court should review this issue for

The trial court's conclusion of law is given

no particular deference.

United Park City Mines Co. v.

Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993).
Preservation in Trial Court.

Fehlauer had alleged

compliance with all conditions in his Complaint and Schwartz

2

had denied the allegations in the Answer.
20.

Record at 3 and

Schwartz filed a Trial Brief addressing this issue.

Record at 72-81.

The trial court acknowledged reviewing

Schwartz's Trial Brief before trial.

Record at 221.

The

trial court addressed the issue in Conclusion of Law Nos. l5.

Record at 169-170.

3.

Issue for Review.

May a trial court reform an express

condition where the trial court did not find a mutual mistake of
fact?
Standard of Review.

The Court should review this issue

using a correction of error standard.

Woodward v. Fazzio,

823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Preservation in Trial Court.

In equity proceedings,

including claims for reformation, the Court is free to
review both the facts and the law as found and applied by
the trial court.

Dugan v. Jones, 724 P.2d 955 (Utah 1986).

III.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of The Case.
This is an equity action for specific performance of a real

estate purchase contract.
B.

Course of Proceedings.
Fehlauer filed his Complaint on September 7, 1993.

Schwartz

answered on December 7, 1993 denying that he was obligated to
convey the property because the following express condition
precedent had not been satisfied:
3

Subject to Sale of House & Property located
at 841 S. W. Hoytsville Rd., Coalville on or
before July 6, 1993.
Exhibit 12.
The condition provided that Schwartz was not required to sell the
property if the sale of adjacent property did not occur on or
before a specified date.
After limited discovery, counsel for Fehlauer filed a
Request for Trial Setting on February 4, 1994.

On March 28,

1994, counsel for the parties and Judge Young participated in a
telephone scheduling conference.

During the conference, counsel

for Schwartz argued that her client could not attend a trial of
the case before July 1994 because he was a candidate for the
Massachusetts State Legislature and that he could not leave
Massachusetts until after the election.
scheduled trial for May 10, 1994.

Nevertheless Judge Young

Record at 210-212.

Shortly after the scheduling conference, it became known
that Schwartz could not attend the scheduled trial on May 10,
1994 because it was the same date as the primary election for the
Massachusetts Legislature.

Therefore, on April 5, 1994, Schwartz

made a written Objection to the Scheduling Order and Trial
Setting, and Motion to Continue Trial.
Appendix Tab 2.

Record at 51-52.

The trial court had granted no previous

continuances and less than six months had passed since Fehlauer
filed the Complaint

4

Counsel for Fehlauer agreed that "the present trial setting
of May 10-11 is inappropriate in view of the May 10 Massachusetts
primary election," and that "exigencies of a campaign preclude an
earlier setting."

Fehlauer further conceded that a victory in

the primary election may require a trial setting after June 7,
the date of the Massachusetts general election.

Record at 64.

On April 26, 1994, Judge Young conducted a Pretrial and
Settlement Conference.

When Judge Young suggested several

possible trial settings through the end of June 1994, Schwartz
stated that he could not commit to a trial setting without
knowing the result of his bid for the Massachusetts Legislature.
Over Schwartz's objections, Judge Young ruled that the trial
would go forward on May 10, 1994, the day of the Massachusetts
primary election.
C.

Record at 212-213.

Disposition in the Court Below.
The trial court conducted a non-jury trial on May 10, 1994.

Schwartz was not present because of his required participation in
and attendance at the Massachusetts primary election.

Trial

counsel for Schwartz renewed her objection to the trial setting
and again sought a continuance.
denied both motions.

Record at 222-236.

Judge Young

Trial counsel for Schwartz did not

otherwise participate except to respond to questions from the
trial court at the end of the trial.

Record at 323-326.

Fehlauer presented his case and the court ruled in his
favor.

The trial court entered the following Conclusions of Law
5

on June 16, 1994 which excused the express condition precedent to
the Contract.
4.
Under the facts and circumstances of this
transaction, the closing of the Madsen contracts by
July 6 was not a material term of the
[Schwartz/Fehlauer] contract so long as those contracts
were actually closed within a reasonable time after
July 6, which they were.
5.
Alternatively, and as an independent ground for
relief, the extension of the Madsen closing date for 15
days, from July 1 to July 16 extended the July 6
provision of the addendum/counterclaim of the
[Schwartz/Fehlauer] contract for the same number of
days, to July 21, 1993. Ms. Madsen had closed before
that date so the [Schwartz/Fehlauer] contract remained
viable.
6.
Alternatively, and as another independent ground
for relief, by its equity jurisdiction the Court can
reform paragraph 6 of the counteroffer/addendum to read
as was understood and intended: "Subject to sale of
house & property located at 841 S. W. Hoytsville Rd,
Coalville to Nancy Madsen pursuant to agreements
already in place."
Record at 169-170.

Appendix Tab 3 (emphasis in original).

trial court entered Final Judgment on June 16, 1994.
173-177.

The

Record at

Appendix Tab 4.
IV.

FACTS

In 1992, Schwartz acquired approximately 23 acres of land
near Hoytsville, Utah from Robert H. and Joan Williams (the
"older Williams") with financing provided by the older Williams.
After living in a house on the property for sometime, Schwartz
listed the property for sale with an agent from Coldwell Banker
who co-listed the property with the older Williams' son, Robert
Williams (the "younger Williams").
6

Schwartz originally listed

all 23 acres of the property, but when it did not sell, he split
the property into two parcels.

The first parcel consisted of

approximately 5 acres upon which a house was constructed
("Parcels A and B") and the remaining parcel consisted of
approximately 17 acres ("Parcel C").

Finding of Fact No. 2.

Record at 162-163.
Nancy C. Madsen ("Madsen") became interested in parcels A
and B but requested that the property be further divided in order
to satisfy her financing needs.

The negotiations resulted in two

separate Earnest Money Sales Agreements.

The first Earnest Money

Sales Agreement provided for the sale of the house and
approximately 3.89 acres ("Parcel A") with financing to be
provided by a lending institution. (Exhibit 8).

The second

covered approximately 2.84 acres of vacant land ("Parcel B") with
financing to be provided by Schwartz.

(Exhibit 7 ) .

Madsen was

to close both agreements by July 1, 1993. Finding of Fact No. 2.
Record at 163.
During this time, Fehlauer searched for a parcel of rural
property upon which to build a home.

He and his wife had been

raised in a rural setting and desired a location that would give
them the benefits of a rural life yet be close to Fehlauer's
employment as a doctor at the University of Utah.

Record at 317.

While conducting a search on their own, they saw a "for sale"
sign on Parcel C and made further inquiries.

These inquiries

resulted in an offer from Fehlauer and a counter offer by
7

Schwartz, which were exchanged by telephone facsimile.
278.

Findings of Fact No. 2 C , 4, 5.

Record at

Record at 163-164A.

These

documents constituted the Contract enforced by the trial court.1
(Exhibit 12). The Contract contained an express condition,
written personally by Schwartz, making the Contract to sell
Parcel C subject to the sale of the adjacent Parcels A and B on
or before July 6, 1993.

Exhibit 12.

Shortly before July 1, 1993, the scheduled closing for the
sale of Parcels A and B to Madsen, the lending institution stated
that it could not complete approval of the loan on Parcel A
because of an issue related to the appraisal.
Fact No. 10.

Record at 165.

Finding of

Schwartz first stated his intention

not to complete the transaction because of the failure to close
both Parcel A and B on July 1, 1993, but eventually closed both
transactions on Friday, July 16, 1993.

Record at 285-286, 288.

He received the proceeds of the sale on Tuesday, July 20, 1993.
Findings of Fact No. 16-17. Record at 166-167.
Prior to closing the sale of Parcels A and B to Madsen,
Schwartz made a payment of $56,000.00 to the older Williams on
July 1, 1993, from funds other than those he later received from
Madsen on July 20, 1993.

Finding of Fact No. 7.

Record at 164.

After closing, Schwartz also gave the older Williams a new note
1

In his Answer, Schwartz denied the existence of the Contract
because a signed version was never delivered to him. For purposes
of this appeal only, however, Schwartz does not contest the
conclusion of law that a valid contract existed.
8

and trust deed against Parcel C for $80,000.00.
No. 15.

Finding of Fact

Record at 166.

Fehlauer made the payments required under the Contract for
Parcel C to Old Republic Title Company of Utah, Inc. ("Old
Republic") before the stated closing date of August 13, 1993.
Finding of Fact No. 21.

Record at 168.

Old Republic sent

documents to Schwartz by Federal Express delivery on August 10,
1993 which Schwartz did not actually receive until August 17,
1993.

Schwartz did not execute the documents because the

condition precedent requiring the sale of the adjacent property
did not occur until July 20, 1993, after the required date of
July 6, 1993.

Old Republic did not complete the closing on

Parcel C because they did not have conveyancing documents from
Schwartz.

Findings of Fact No. 20 and 22.
V.

Record at 167-168.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The trial court abused its discretion in not continuing the
trial from May 10, 1994 when it learned that the trial date was
the same day as a special primary election in Massachusetts for
which Schwartz was a candidate.

By conducting the trial on a

date that Schwartz could not attend, the trial court denied
Schwartz the right to be in attendance at his own trial, to
testify on his own behalf and to assist his trial counsel.
Even if the trial court had not abused its discretion by
refusing to continue the trial, the trial court erred in excusing
the condition which unequivocally required the sale of adjacent
9

property before a specific date.

Because this term was an

express condition precedent containing a specific time limit, it
did not also require a "time is of the essence" clause.

The

express condition precedent could only be satisfied by strict
compliance.
Finally, the trial court reformed the express condition
precedent without finding that Schwartz and Fehlauer had made a
mutual mistake of fact and without any evidence that the parties
made a mutual mistake.
VI.
A.

ARGUMENTS

The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Conducting the
Trial on the Same Day Schwartz Was a Candidate for the
Massachusetts Legislature in a Special Primary Election.
The Utah Supreme Court has provided guidance for determining

when a trial court abuses its discretion in not granting a
continuance.

In Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977)

the Court stated:
When counsel has made timely objections,
given necessary notice, and made a reasonable
effort to have the trial date changed for
good cause, courts have held it to be an
abuse of discretion not to grant a
continuance.
560 P.2d. at 1376 (emphasis added).
Although Schwartz complied with these requirements and made every
effort to inform the trial court of his dilemma, the court
refused to grant a continuance.

The trial court's refusal

constitutes an abuse of its discretion.

10

1.

Schwartz Repeatedly Made Known to the Trial
Court that he was a Candidate for the
Massachusetts Legislature in a Special
Primary Election Held on the Same Day Set for
Trial,

Schwartz made timely objections and gave necessary notice to
the court that he was required to participate in and to attend
the special primary election for the Massachusetts Legislature on
the day scheduled for trial.2

First, on March 28, 1994, during a

telephone scheduling conference, Schwartz told the trial court of
his candidacy for the Massachusetts State Legislature and of the
fact that this commitment would make it difficult for him to
attend a trial in Utah until July 1994.

The trial court,

nevertheless set the trial for May 10, 1994.
Second, on April 5, 1994, upon learning that the
Massachusetts special primary election in May was scheduled for
the very day that the trial court had scheduled the trial,
Schwartz filed an Objection to Scheduling Order and Trial Setting
and Motion to Continue Trial.

Schwartz filed his motion within

seven days after the telephone scheduling conference and more
than thirty days before the scheduled trial date.

Record at 51.

Schwartz supported the motion with a certificate from the town
clerk of Douglas, Massachusetts confirming that Schwartz was a

2

Rather than attend the May 10 trial, Schwartz participated
successfully in the Massachusetts primary. He was subsequently
defeated in the general election held on June 7, 1993. Thus, as
events occurred Schwartz would have been available for trial in
Utah anytime after June 7, 1993.
11

candidate for State Representative in the special state primary
on May 10, 1994.

Record at 62.

Instead of vigorously opposing the motion, Fehlauer agreed
with Schwartz and acknowledged that the trial setting of May 10
was "inopportune."

Fehlauer then suggested a procedure whereby

the trial court would review the trial setting in light of the
results of Schwartz's candidacy in Massachusetts with a
possibility that the trial could be held as late as July if
Schwartz continued to win elections and indeed served as a
Representative in the Massachusetts Legislature.

Record at 64.

Third, on April 26, 1994, at the Pretrial Scheduling
Conference, Schwartz reiterated that he could not attend on May
10, 1994 and could not commit to another date before July because
he did not know the results of his bid for the Massachusetts
Legislature.

The trial court and counsel for Schwartz and

Fehlauer reviewed the available dates on the trial court's
calendar through the end of June 1994 when Judge Young was
scheduled to be replaced in Summit County.

Despite Schwartz's

arguments, the trial court denied the Motion to Continue and
ordered that trial be conducted on May 10, 1994.

Record at 212-

213.
Finally, on May 10, 1994, the date of trial, Schwartz
renewed his objection to the trial setting and motion to
continue.

The trial court again denied the motion.

222-236.
12

Record at

Schwartz repeatedly made known to the trial court that he
could not attend the scheduled trial date.

Nevertheless, the

trial court refused to continue the trial.
2.

Schwartz Made Reasonable Efforts to Have the Trial
Date Changed for Good Cause.

Schwartz also made reasonable efforts to have the trial date
changed for good cause.

Schwartz's participation in a special

primary election outside of Utah on the same day set for trial
presented sufficient cause to have the trial date changed.

He

also made reasonable arguments why he could not commit in advance
to a trial date without knowing the results of the primary
election on May 10 and the final election on June 7, 1994.

If he

won both elections, he would be committed to attend legislative
sessions until July 11, 1994.
The trial court dismissed these arguments apparently
believing he was compelled to schedule the trial before July
because his assignment as a judge in Summit County expired June
30.

However, nothing in the Rules of Civil Procedure or the

Rules of Judicial Administration would have prevented the trial
court from deferring trial until after July 1, 1994 when a new
judge would be assigned duty in Summit County.

The trial court

had decided no other pretrial motions that would have given him
any particular familiarity with the case so as to make him more
efficient than any other judge to conduct the trial.

The only

prior hearings before the trial court had been the scheduling

13

conferences on March 28, 1994 and April 26, 1994.

Even if the

trial court had some familiarity with the case, no prohibition
would have prevented holding the trial in Salt Lake City during
July, upon the consent of the parties.
Fehlauer advanced his desire to take advantage of the
construction year as the reason for conducting a trial before
July 1994.

Record at 211.

However, even a trial in July would

have provided Fehlauer with construction time during the
remainder of the summer and fall.

A trial on May 10 rather than

in July gained only approximately eight weeks.

This possible

delay in construction time to Fehlauer must be compared to the
actual denial to Schwartz of his ability to participate at trial.
Schwartz's actual loss of the ability to participate and defend
himself at trial far overshadows Fehlauer's possible loss of
construction time.
This case is similar to Bairas v. Johnson, 13 Utah 2d. 269,
373 P.2d 375 (1962) in which the Utah Supreme Court found an
abuse of discretion when a party could not attend his trial.

A

plaintiff had filed a personal injury claim resulting from an
automobile accident which had left him paralyzed in a hospital in
California.

After two prior postponements, because the

plaintiff's medical condition did not permit attendance in Utah,
the trial court set a new trial date.

Two days before trial,

plaintiff's California counsel advised the trial court by

14

telegram that plaintiff's condition did not permit his travel to
and attendance at a trial in Utah.
On the day set for trial, with the defendants in court,
witnesses present and the jury in the box, plaintiff's counsel
moved for another continuance.

The defendant had objected to

prior continuances upon the ground that the plaintiff's lawsuit
was the sole barrier to final disposition of the defendant's
estate and that delay would cause hardship, inconvenience and
additional penalties and interest to the defendants.

The trial

court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, ruled that
insufficient grounds for a continuance existed and ruled that
timely notice had not been given.
The Utah Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial
court's refusal to grant an additional continuance was an abuse
of discretion.

The Court reasoned in part that:

[I]t is in accord with the most fundamental
traditions of our legal system that a party
should be afforded every reasonable
opportunity to be in attendance at his trial.
Id. at 378 (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court also recognized "the importance of allowing a
party to be in attendance at the trial to testify and assist his
counsel."

Id.

The Court concluded by stating:
We are, of course, cognizant that the fiveweek delay would have resulted in some
hardship to the defendants and others, and
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that two witnesses have died since the
accident. However, the relative significance
of these facts is overshadowed by the
potential loss to the plaintiff.
Id. (emphasis added).
The trial court in the present case did not afford Schwartz
every reasonable opportunity to be in attendance at his trial.
Further, the trial court ignored the importance of allowing
Schwartz to be in attendance to testify and assist his counsel.
Finally, the potential delay in Fehlauer's construction plans was
far overshadowed by the actual loss to Schwartz of his right to
attend and participate in the trial.

For the foregoing reasons,

the trial court abused its discretion by denying Schwartz the
opportunity to be in attendance at his own trial and to testify
and assist his counsel.
B.

The Trial Court Should Not Have Excused the Condition
Precedent in the Contract which Makes Schwartz's
Obligations Subject to the Sale of an Adjacent Property
on or Before July 6. 1993.
Even if the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

refusing to continue the trial, it did make fundamental errors of
law based on the evidence presented solely by Fehlauer.

The

trial court improperly ignored the express condition precedent to
Schwartz's obligation to convey the property.
1.

The Clause of the Contract Making Schwartz's
Obligation Subject to the Sale of an Adjacent
Property on or Before July 6, 1993 is an
Express Condition Precedent.

16

The Contract which Fehlauer sought to enforce contained the
following clause:
Subject to Sale of House & Property at 841
S.W. Hoytsville Rd., Coalville or before July
6, 1993.
Exhibit 12 (emphasis added).
This clause created an express condition precedent to Schwartz'
obligation to convey the property to Fehlauer.
The general rule is that the use of the words "subject to"
creates a condition precedent.
at 487 (1991).

17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 466

For example, in Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, 621

P.2d 1240, 1242 (Utah 1980) the Utah Supreme Court upheld a
finding that a clause in a real estate purchase contract
containing the words "subject to" created a condition precedent.
It further held that if the described event did not occur, the
performance by the seller would be excused.
Similarly, numerous other courts have expressly recognized
that the use of the term "subject to" creates a condition
precedent.

E.g. Riess v. Murchinson, 329 F.2d 635, 643 (9th Cir.

1964), cert, denied 383 U.S. 946 (1966) ("subject to" makes a
contractual duty dependent upon the occurrence of an uncertain
event); Ross v. Harding, 391 P.2d 526, 531 (Wash. 1964) ("subject
to" language leaves no room for interpretation that performance
of a promise is dependent upon some other event); Boulevard
Builders, Inc. v. Snyder, 108 N.W.2d 914, 915 (Wis. 1961)
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("subject to" are "usual words used in creating and stating a
condition precedent").
Fehlauer did not contest the conclusion that this "subject
to" clause created a condition precedent.

Rather, when the

condition had not been satisfied, Fehlauer argued that strict
performance of the express condition precedent should be excused.
2.

An Express Condition Precedent Containing a Time
Limit Does not Also Require an Express Agreement
that Time is of the Essence.

Fehlauer argued and the trial court concluded that the time
limit of July 6, 1993 could be analyzed for materiality because a
"time is of the essence" provision did not apply to the express
condition precedent.

Conclusion of Law No. 3.

Record at 170.

The trial court therefore concluded that the July 6, 1993 date
was not a material term and that the express condition precedent
could be satisfied so long as the adjacent property was sold
within a reasonable time after July 6, 1993.
No. 4.

Record at 170.

Conclusion of Law

The trial court erred in holding that the

express condition precedent also required a "time is of the
essence" provision in order for the July 6, 1993 deadline to be
strictly observed.
The Utah Court of Appeals recognized the principles of when
"time is of the essence" provisions are required in Barker v.
Francis, 741 P.2d 548, 552 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

A seller under

a land exchange agreement claimed that the contract was void
because of the buyers failure to perform in a timely manner.
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The Court of Appeals noted the general law concerning time of the
essence provisions:
Time is of the essence in land contracts only
if it can be shown that the parties so
intended. This can be demonstrated in two
ways. First, the contract can explicitly
state that time is of the essence, or it can
include language that requires a forfeiture
of the deposit or an avoidance of the
contract if the deadline is not met. Second,
the circumstances surrounding the transaction
can imply that "the parties intended
timeliness of performance to be of paramount
concern."
Id. at 552 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
If the contractual language specifically allows a party to avoid
the contract if the terms of a condition are not met by a
specific deadline, then a "time is of the essence" clause is
irrelevant.

The language used in the Fehlauer/Schwartz Contract

constitutes an avoidance of the Contract and sets a specific
deadline.

Therefore the presence of a "time is of the essence"

clause is not required.
Courts from other jurisdictions have reached the same
conclusion.

In Renovest Co. v. Hodges Development Corp., 600

A.2d 448 (N.H. 1991) the New Hampshire Supreme Court considered a
buyer's obligation to perform under a contract for the purchase
of an apartment complex which contained several conditions
precedent.

Two of the conditions required the buyer to notify

the seller by a specified date if the buyer intended to terminate
the contract because of an unsatisfactory inspection or an

19

inability to obtain financing.

The buyer did not complete the

sale and sued for recovery of its deposit.

The seller defended

on several grounds including the fact that the buyer had not
given written notice within the deadlines set forth in the two
conditions.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court recognized the general rule
that ordinarily time is not made of the essence in a contract
unless there is some indication that the parties intended
otherwise.

Id. at 452.

However, the court concluded that this

general rule was not applicable because the terms involved were
express conditions precedent.

Id.

The court noted:

The reasoning behind this rule is that when
the parties expressly condition their
performance upon the occurrence or nonoccurrence of an event, rather than simply
including the event as one of the general
terms of the contract, the parties'
bargained-for expectation of strict
compliance should be given effect.
Id. at 452-53.
Thus, the court strictly enforced the date stated in the
contract.
Similarly in Barnes v. Euster, 214 A.2d 807 (Md. Ct. App.
1965) the Maryland Court of Appeals considered a case where a
buyer sought specific performance of a contract which contained
an express condition precedent requiring necessary zoning before
a certain date.

Although the court decided the case on other

grounds, it recognized that even though the contract did not
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expressly make time of the essence, by reason of the condition
"the contract was like a unilateral contract, such as an option,
in which the law makes time of the essence . . . ."
See also, Clarke v. Lacv, 132

Jd. at 809.

A.2d 478, 483 (Md. Ct. App. 1957).

The trial court's conclusion that the time deadline of July
6, 1993 was not material because a "time is of the essence"
provision did not apply is wrong as a matter of law.

An express

condition precedent containing a time deadline expressly avoids
the Contract if the stated event does not occur before the
deadline.

The condition does not require an additional explicit

statement that time is of the essence.
3.

An Express Condition Precedent Must be
Satisfied by Strict Compliance.

Because the clause concerning the sale of adjacent property
is an express condition precedent, which does not require a
separate "time is of the essence" provision, it can only be
satisfied by strict compliance.

The trial court erred as a

matter of law by concluding that the express condition precedent
could be satisfied by material compliance so long as the adjacent
property was sold within a reasonable time after July 6, 1993.
Conclusion of Law No. 4.

Record at 170.

The trial court also

erred as a matter of law by concluding that the express condition
precedent could be satisfied by material compliance so long as
the adjacent property was sold within the same number of days
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after July 6, 1993 as the number of days the adjacent property
was sold late.

Conclusion of Law No. 5.

Record at 170.

Utah courts have consistently required strict compliance
with express condition precedents.

In Woodard v. Jensen, 740

P.2d 272 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) cert, dismissed. 766 P.2d 1072
(1988) the Court of Appeals, considered specific performance of a
real estate purchase contract which made the seller's obligation
conditioned upon the recording of a certain parcel with the
county recorder.

Subsequent changes in county requirements made

it impossible to subdivide and record the parcel.

The Court held

that because recording was a condition precedent to the seller's
duties and the condition precedent had not been fulfilled, the
equitable remedy of specific performance was not available to the
buyer.

Id. at 274-275.

Similarly in Welch Transfer and Storage. Inc. v. Oldham. 663
P.2d 73 (Utah 1983) the Utah Supreme Court considered a contract
to exchange real property which required the approval of the
Small Business Administration ("SBAM) to the reciprocal
assumption of loans.

The SBA approved the mutual assumption but

also required that each party guarantee the others' debt.

This

additional requirement by the SBA did not satisfy the condition.
The Court held that:
Where fulfillment of a contract is made to
depend upon the act or consent of a third
person over whom neither party has any
control, the contract cannot be enforced
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unless the act is performed or the consent
given.
Id. at 76.
The Welch Transfer case recognizes the principle that a
condition precedent must be strictly satisfied even if
fulfillment of the condition depends upon the act of a third
person.

Fulfillment of the condition in the Schwartz/Fehlauer

Contract that the adjacent property be sold before July 6, 1993
depended upon the act of a third party, either Madsen or some
other buyer.

Welch Transfer teaches that the court cannot excuse

the condition even though satisfaction of the condition is
outside the control of either party.
Another example is found in Braithwaite v. Sorensen. 561
P.2d 1083 (Utah 1987) where the parties made performance of a
real estate purchase contract dependent upon the release of a
federal tax lien within three years.

When the tax lien was not

released, the buyers argued that the express condition should be
excused since they were willing to pay the difference between the
amount of the tax lien and the amount held on deposit in an
escrow.

The Supreme Court held that since the contingency did

not occur within the three years the parties were released of all
obligations under the contract.

Ijd. at 1084.

These cases are consistent with the major treatises on
contracts and the Restatement.

These authorities make the strict

compliance requirement clear:
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As a general rule, conditions which are
either expressed or implied in fact must be
exactly fulfilled or no liability can arise
on the promise which such conditions qualify.
5 Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts, § 675 at
184 (3rd ed. 1961).
If the occurrence of a condition is required
by the agreement of the parties, rather than
as a matter of law, a rule of strict
compliance traditionally applies.
2 E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts. § 8.3 at 3 53
(1990).
If, however, the parties have made an event a
condition of their agreement, there is no
mitigating standard of materiality or
substantiality applicable to the nonoccurrence of the event.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 237 (comment d ) .
Several cases from other jurisdictions illustrate the
application of these principles.

In Ferlita v. Guarneri. 524

N.Y.S.2d 94 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) the court considered an action
for specific performance of a real estate contract that was
expressly conditioned upon the buyer obtaining a financing
commitment within a specified time.

The buyer did not obtain the

commitment but scheduled a closing anyway.

The seller did not

attend the closing and the buyer sued for specific performance.
The appellate court held that the buyer was not obligated to
complete the sale.
It is a fundamental tenet of contract law
that a writing which clearly and
unambiguously expresses the intention of the
parties should not be modified by the court.
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. . . The clause constitutes a defense to the
[buyers] action for specific performance as a
matter of law.
Id. at 95-96.
In Laz-Karp Realty. Inc. v. Gilbert, 777 F. Supp. 1085
(D. R.I. 1990) the court considered a purchase and sale agreement
for real estate which provided that either party could terminate
the agreement if condemnation of the property did not occur by a
specified date.

When the condemnation did not occur, the buyer

sued for return of its deposit.

The court held that the parties'

obligations to perform were excused because the condition
precedent did not occur by the specified date.

The court

reasoned that condemnation might well have been to the benefit of
the buyer, "[b]ut, even if no specific benefit flowed from
condemnation, the parties had agreed upon it as the course of
action."

Id. at 1088.

The Laz-Karp case points out the error of the trial court's
conclusion that the July 6, 1993 date was not material or
important so long as the sale of the adjacent property was
completed first.

No special benefit needed to have flowed to

either Schwartz or Fehlauer by reference to the July 6, 1993
date.

The parties had agreed upon it as the date by which the

sale of the adjacent property must be completed in order for
Schwartz's obligations to survive.

If the adjacent property did

not sell by July 6, Schwartz had no obligation to sell to
Fehlauer.
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Finally, in Covington v. Robinson. 723 S.W.2d. 643 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1986) the parties had made a real estate purchase
agreement contingent upon the buyers obtaining a bank loan for
75% of the purchase price.

The Tennessee Court of Appeals held

that the trial court was in error in holding that a loan in the
amount of 73.9% was substantial performance that would excuse the
non-occurrence of the condition precedent.

Id. at 645.

The trial court erred because it permitted the express
condition precedent to be satisfied by material or substantial
compliance rather than strict compliance.

Its legal conclusion

that the express condition precedent was satisfied so long as the
adjacent property sold within a reasonable time after July 6,
1993 or within the extended term of the Madsen contract is
contrary to law and should be reversed.
4.

The Express Condition Precedent in the
Contract Does Not Create A Forfeiture.

The Restatement of Contracts has recognized one limited
situation in which conditions precedent may be excused in order
to avoid a forfeiture.
Excuse of a Condition to Avoid Forfeiture
To the extent that the non-occurrence of a
condition would cause disproportionate
forfeiture, a court may excuse a nonoccurrence of that condition unless its
occurrence was a material part of the agreed
exchange.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 229.
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Fehlauer did not argue this principle to the trial court and
did not put on evidence that a forfeiture would occur.

Also, the

trial court did not rely upon this principle for his conclusions
of law.

Even if this principle had been considered, it does not

apply.
Courts have used this principle to excuse express conditions
precedent in only a limited number of special circumstances not
applicable here.

For example, in the area of insurance

contracts, courts will sometimes excuse the express condition
requiring prompt notice because the insured will forfeit its
right to indemnification after paying substantial premiums.

See,

e.g. Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 344 A.2d 555 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1975) aff'd, 371 A.2d 193 (Pa. 1977); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
Murphy, 538 A.2d 219 (Conn. 1988).

Courts will sometimes excuse

an express condition requiring certain actions in order to renew
a lease where the lessee has made substantial leasehold
improvements.

See, e.g. J.N.A. Realty Corp. v. Cross Bay

Chelsea. Inc., 366 N.E.2d 1313 (N.Y. 1977); Ledford v. Atkins,
413 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967).

Courts will also occasionally

excuse a condition to performance of a real estate purchase
contract where substantial sums have already been paid to the
seller.

See, Wortman v. Jessen, 159 N.W.2d 564 (Neb. 1968).

Courts will also sometimes excuse a condition precedent in the
area of general contracts where one party has partially or
completely performed his obligations.
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See, Burger King Corp. v.

Family Dining Inc., 426 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Pa.) aff'd.. 560 F.2d
1168 (3rd Cir. 1977).
The trial court did not face any of these situations because
Fehlauer had made no payments to Schwartz on July 6, 1993 when
the condition was to be satisfied.3

The closest finding that

could conceivably be argued as a forfeiture by Fehlauer is that
Fehlauer took on extra work in order to service his debt for the
purchase of the property.
168.

Finding of Fact No. 23.

Record at

This event does not create a forfeiture, because Fehlauer

will retain the benefits of his extra work regardless of whether
he receives the property.
Fehlauer will also forfeit nothing because his obligations
under the Contract were entirely executory.

To the extent that

he relied upon his expectations under the Contract in preparing
to perform, his reliance was not justified.

The condition had

not been satisfied by its own terms more than thirty days before
Fehlauer was called upon to perform.

Fehlauer knew that the

condition precedent had not been satisfied when the adjacent
property did not sell on or before July 6, 1993.

He therefore

had no justification in preparing to perform on August 13, 1993.

3

Fehlauer had made a $1,500.00 deposit with the real estate
agent, which would be returned to him if the sale did not go
through because of the failed condition. Exhibit 12.
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C.

The Trial Court did Not Find that Fehlauer and Schwartz
had Made a Mistake of Fact so as to Support a
Reformation of the Contract.
1.

Reformation of a Contract Requires a Finding
by Clear and Convincing Proof that a Mutual
Mistake of Fact Has Occurred.

The final way in which the trial court attempted to excuse
the express condition precedent was to remove the phrase "on or
before July 6, 1993" and replace it with the phrase "to Nancy
Madsen pursuant to agreements already in place".
Law No. 6.

Conclusion of

Record at 170.

A claim for reformation did not appear in the original
complaint filed by Fehlauer.

Record at 1-13.

The trial court

apparently considered the claim pursuant to an "Amendment to
Complaint" filed May 2, 1994, less than eight days before the
trial on May 10, 1994 and without an Order of the Court or
written consent by Schwartz as required by Rule 15(a) Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.

Record at 83-85.

Even if the trial court properly had before it a claim for
reformation, the trial court was still required to accurately
apply the law of reformation.

That law is well stated in Briggs

v. Liddell, 699 P.2d 770 (Utah 1985) where the Utah Supreme Court
considered a claim for reformation of a life insurance policy.
wife had designated her sister as beneficiary under a life
insurance policy provided by a bank when her husband opened a
joint checking account.

The husband contended that the wife
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A

intended to make her sister a contingent rather than a primary
beneficiary•

The trial court ruled in favor of the husband but

the Supreme Court reversed and held in favor of the sister.

In

making its holding the Court restated the law of reformation in
Utah:
As we have recently stated, a court's
equitable powers are narrowly bounded. "A
court does not have carte blanche to reform
any transaction to include terms it believes
are fair" . . . A contract may be reformed
for either of two reasons. First, if the
instrument does not embody the intentions of
both parties to the contract, a mutual
mistake has occurred, and reformation is
appropriate. Second, if one party is
laboring under a mistake about a contract
term and that mistake either has been induced
by the other party or is known by and
conceded to bv the other party, then the
inequitable nature of the other party's
conduct will have the same operable effect as
a mistake, and reformation is permissible.
. . . Under either set of circumstances,
because courts are reluctant to change
contractual obligations and rights, the party
seeking reformation must plead the
circumstances constituting the mistake with
particularity. Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b) . . .
Additionally, the party seeking reformation
must establish the mistake by clear and
convincing proof that "clinches what might be
otherwise only probable to the mind."
Id. at 772 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court found that the husband presented no
evidence of mutual mistake by the sister on the one hand and the
insurance company on the other.

Nor did the husband present any

evidence that the insurance company induced the mistake or knew
of and took advantage of a mistake.
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Finally the trial court's

findings and conclusions did not address the issue of mutual
mistake.

The Supreme Court thus concluded that under settled law

the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of reformation.
Id. at 773.

See also

Bown v. Loveland, 678 P.2d 292 (Utah 1994)

(complaint did not plead mistake or fraud, much less describe
them with particularity; evidence did not rise to standard of
clear and convincing).
2.

The Trial Court did not Find that Fehlauer
and Schwartz made a Mutual Mistake of Fact.

Of all the findings of fact made by the trial court, none
find that Schwartz and Fehlauer made a mutual mistake as to the
wording of the express condition precedent making Schwartz'
obligations contingent upon sale of adjacent property before July
6, 1993.

The closest finding concerning the condition is the

following:
6. With respect to paragraph 6, it was the
understanding of plaintiff [Fehlauer], his
realtor and the Coldwell agents that this
language pertained to the prior known
requirement that the sale of Parcels A and B
to Ms. Madsen must occur or Parcel C would
not be sold; if the Madsen sales fell
through, defendant would not sell Parcel C.
Record at 164.

Appendix Tab 3.

This finding does not contain the facts necessary to support the
first reason stated in Briggs for reforming an instrument under
Utah law.

It does not find that the instrument fails to embody

the intentions of both Schwartz and Fehlauer.

At best, the

finding states what Fehlauer and the realtors thought was
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Schwartz's reason for including the condition language in the
Contract.

The unilateral understanding of one party never

expressed to the other cannot form the basis of an equitable
reformation.

Briggs v. Liddell, 699 P.2d 770, 773 (Utah 1985).

Further, the trial court did not find that Fehlauer labored
under a mistake about the express condition precedent and further
did not find that Schwartz induced the mistake or that Schwartz
knew of the mistake and concealed it.

Thus, the trial court also

did not find the facts necessary to support the second reason
stated in Briggs for reformation of an instrument under Utah law.
Without these findings of fact, the trial court's conclusion
of law that the express condition precedent ought to be reformed
constitutes an error of law.

The trial court's conclusion

improperly rewrote the Contract.
3.

The Evidence Does Not Contain Clear and
Convincing Proof that Fehlauer and Schwartz
made a Mutual Mistake of Fact.

Even if the trial court had made findings of fact sufficient
to support its conclusions of law, such findings would not have
been supported by the evidence.

Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, provides in relevant part that:
When findings of fact are made in actions
tried by the court without a jury, the
question of the sufficiency of the evidence
to support the findings may thereafter be
raised whether or not the party raising the
question has made in the district court an
objection to such findings or had made either
a motion to amend them, a motion for
judgment, or a motion for new trial.
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This court may therefore examine the evidence even though
Schwartz did not contest the evidence in the trial court because
he was unable to attend.
The trial transcript does not contain any evidence that the
condition precedent requiring the sale of the adjacent property
before July 6, 1994, did not embody the intentions of both
parties or even that Fehlauer was laboring under a mistake about
the Contract term.

At trial, only two witnesses testified

concerning the term.

The first witness called by Fehlauer was

the younger Williams, one of two agents who obtained the listing
to sell the property for Schwartz.
—

He testified as follows:

Q

And it follows the
handwriting.

A

No, No. 5 is in Mr. Schwartz' handwriting.

Q

Would you read it once again to the court?

A

Yes. "Subject to sale of house and property located at
841 South West Hoytsville Road, Coalville, on or before
July 6, 1993."

Q

Did you have any discussion with Mr. Schwartz about why
the July 6th date was entered into here?

A

I think — I don't remember an exact discussion on that
date but it was to coincide with getting the closing
done on the house and property which was scheduled for
the first. And I'm not sure exactly why we picked the
6th but I think it was just to buffer the time a little
bit in case there was some lender delay.

Q

Do you remember — well, do the Madsen contracts, which
are in evidence, did they require a closing date on or
before July 1?

A

July 1, yes.
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No. 5 is not in your

Q

Do you know where the five days between July 1 and July
6th come from?

A

I don't know exactly where that came from. But the
purpose was to be certain that the Madsen money were
safely in the bank before —

Q

Before

A

Before closing on this, correct.

—

Record at 278-279.
The only other witness to testify concerning the terms of
the Contract was the plaintiff Fehlauer.

The sum of his

testimony concerning the Contract terms was as follows:
Q

And that led to the offer that was dated June 25.

A

That's correct.

Q

And the counteroffer back and the final offer in which
you accepted a full listing price of $120,000,00.
Agreed to pay that price all on that same day.

A

Yes.

Record at 319.
The real estate agent for Fehlauer did not testify at the trial.
The foregoing evidence does not support a finding, even
viewing the evidence and inferences in a light most favorable to
the trial court's conclusion of law, that a mutual mistake had
occurred between Schwartz and Fehlauer over the wording of the
condition precedent.

No one stated that the Contract condition

should have been "to Nancy Madsen pursuant to agreements already
in place" instead of "on or before July 6, 1993."
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The most that

could be said is that the younger Williams stated his belief as
to the reason Schwartz chose the date of July 6, 1993.
Further, Fehlauer never stated that the term was a mistake
or that he was laboring under a mistake that the term should have
read differently.

Certainly, the evidence does not rise to the

standard of establishing the mistake by clear and convincing
proof that "clinches what might be otherwise only probable in the
mind."

Briaas v. Liddell. 699 P.2d 770, 772 (Utah 1985).

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's reformation of
the Contract is neither supported by a finding of fact that a
mutual mistake occurred nor by evidence establishing a mistake by
clear and convincing proof.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals should reverse the judgment of the
trial court and enter judgement in favor of Schwartz because,
even taking the evidence presented solely by Fehlauer at trial,
the express condition precedent to Schwartz's obligations was not
satisfied or excused.

Alternatively, the Court of Appeals should

remand the case to the trial court for a new trial at a time that
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Schwartz may attend, testify on his own behalf, and assist his
counsel.
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Janet A. Goldstein (4326)
Attorney for Defendant
Deer Valley Plaza, Suite 208
Post Office Box 4556
Park City, UT 84060
(801) 649-1996

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

C. STEVEN FEHLAUER
Plaintiff,

vs.

THOMAS H. SCHWARTZ
Defendant.

])
)
])

OBJECTION TO SCHEDULING
ORDER AND TRIAL SETTING, AND
MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL

;>
>

Civil No.
Judge:

930312024 CN
David S. Young

;
]

Comes now Defendant, Thomas H. Schwartz and objects to the Scheduling Order and
the trial setting in the above-noted case, and moves the Court to continue the trial date set in the
matter. This Objection and Motion are supported by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities
which is filed herewith.
DATED this

^ ^

day of April, 1994

Janet A. Goldstein
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On the
£T day of April, I certifiy that I caused to be served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Objection to Trial Setting and Motion to Continue Trial Date, postage prepaid,
by mailing same to the following:
H. James Clegg, Esq.
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

^k^iiS^Lte—
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Janet A. Goldstein (4326)
Attorney for Defendant
Deer Valley Plaza, Suite 208
Post Office Box 4556
Park City, UT 84060
(801) 649-1996

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

C. STEVEN FEHLAUER

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
OBJECTION TO SCHEDULING
ORDER AND TRIAL SETTING, AND
MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL

Plaintiff,

vs.

Civil No.
Judge:

THOMAS H. SCHWARTZ

930312024 CN
David S. Young

Defendant.

Comes now Defendant, Thomas H. Schwartz, by and through undersigned counsel, and
respectfully submits the following Memorandum in Support of Objection to Scheduling Order
and Trial Setting and Motion to Continue Trial.
BACKGROUND
The underlying dispute in this matter involves a claim for specific performance regarding
a parcel of property in Summit County, Utah. Defendant is, however, a resident of the State
of Massachusetts.
In the early summer of 1993, the parties entered into an Earnest Money Agreement in

which there were several conditions that had to be satisfied before a sale of the property could
occur. Based on the non-occurrence of at least one condition, the sale did not close. Thereafter,
Plaintiff initiated the instant action in September of 1993. At the same time, Plaintiff filed a
Notice of Lis Pendens regarding the subject property. In early October, an Answer and
Counterclaim was filed. In late October, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Dismiss the First and Third
Causes of Action contained in the Counterclaim. Following discussions between counsel and
agreement of the parties, Defendant agreed to drop the first and third causes of action in the
Counterclaim and to appear at a deposition in Utah so that the case could either be settled or
proceed on the real matter at issue in this case.
On November 30, 1993, Defendant interrupted a visit with his daughter in Arizona and
made a special trip to Salt Lake City to testify at a deposition scheduled by Plaintiff. At the
conclusion of the deposition, the parties discussed the possibilities of settlement. Counsel for
Plaintiff stated that he wanted to depose and/or obtain relevant documents from the real estate
broker that had handled the transaction. On February 1, Plaintiffs counsel indicated that he had
received the documents that he had requested from the broker.
In January 1994, Defendant was drafted as a candidate by his political party in
Massachusetts to run for a vacated seat in the Massachusetts Legislature.

Thereafter, on

February 1, Defendant made a settlement offer to resolve this matter. On February 4, 1994,
Plaintiff filed a Request for Trial Setting. On February 10, 1994 Plaintiffs counsel indicated
that he had sent a letter containing a counter-offer for settlement, which Defendant's counsel
never received.
In March, Plaintiffs counsel set up a conference call for March 17, 1994, for scheduling
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in this matter, which conference call was never made. At that time, Defendant's counsel
informed Plaintiffs counsel that Defendant would not be able to leave Massachusetts until July,
due to Defendant's commitments in as a candidate for a seat in the Massachusetts State
Legislature. Plaintiffs counsel, however, insisted on setting up a scheduling conference, which
was held on the telephone with the Court on March 28, 1994. Thereafter, the Court set the trial
in this matter for May 10 and 11, 1994. See copy of Scheduling Order attached hereto as
Exhibit "A" and incorporated by reference herein. May 10, 1994 is the date of the primary
election in the Massachusetts legislative race.

See copy of certified letter from Betty Ann

McCallum, Town Clerk, Town of Douglas, Massachusetts, which is attached hereto as Exhibit
"B" and incorporated by reference herein.
Because of the necessity that Defendant remain in the state of Massachusetts until his
campaign is completed, Defendant must object to the Scheduling Order and the trial setting in
as set forth in Exhibit A, and moves the Court to continue the trial to a date in July or August
of this year.
ARGUMENT
THE OBJECTION AND MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE IS TIMELY, NECESSARY,
AND SUPPORTED BY GOOD CAUSE
The Plaintiff in this case brought the instant suit against the Defendant last fall. Since
that time, Defendant has cooperated fully in the process and has done nothing to cause
unnecessary delay. This is not a case which has dragged on for years or one in which repeated
continuances have been sought.

The Plaintiff just recently completed his discovery.

The

Defendant has not even undertaken discovery in this matter. The Defendant has, however, a
significant commitment in the form of his candidacy for the State Legislature of the State of
3

Massachusetts. The primary election in that race will be held on the first day that the Court just
recently set for trial in this matter. See Exhibit B. The Defendant has no choice but to be
present in Massachusetts on that date. Although at the time that the trial was set, Defendant's
counsel objected to the setting on the basis of the Defendant's candidacy, counsel was at that
time unaware of the primary election date. Based upon that new information, it is even more
critical that the Defendant obtain a continuance of the trial date in this matter.
Pursuant to Rule 40(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may make a motion to
continue a trial, upon a showing of good cause. The Defendant has made such a showing. See
Exhibit MB." Additionally, there can be little doubt that in the event that the Defendant is not
present at the trial of the case brought against him, the Defendant will be unable to assist in his
defense, and the Defendant will be unable to present material evidence as to the events that
occurred at the time and as to the matter of which the Plaintiff complains. The result would be
overwhelming prejudice to the Defendant.
The Defendant acknowledges that the grant of such a motion under Rule 40(b) lies within
the discretion of the Court. However, in light of the fact that the trial setting was made, over
the objection of the Defendant's counsel, less than ten days ago, that this is the first such
request, that notice is being provided, that the Defendant's unavailability is virtually beyond his
control, and that the Defendant is a resident of another state who clearly did not choose to
become involved in this litigation in Utah, good cause exists to grant the continuance of the trial.
In Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375, 1376 (Utah 1977), the court stated that,
When counsel has made timely objections, given necessary notice, and has
made a reasonable effort to have the trial date changed for good cause, courts
have held it to be an abuse of discretion not to grant a continuance.
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(footnote and citations omitted). In that case, the defendants' counsel was not available on the
date that the court set for trial. The defendants promptly filed an objection, but the matter was
not heard and the defendants did not appear at the trial without their counsel. A default was
entered against the defendants. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case and held
that, inter alia, on the basis of equity and "the basic rights of a party to be heard, the trial court
erred in not setting aside the default judgment." Id.
More recently, in State v. Creviston. 646 P.2d 750 (Utah 1982), Justice Durham noted
that,
It is well established in Utah, as elsewhere, that the granting of a
continuance is at the discretion of the trial judge, whose decision will not be
reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Abuse mav be found where a
party has made timely objections, given necessary notice and made a reasonable
effort to have the trial date reset for good cause.
Id. at 752 (emphasis added)(citations omitted).
Although the grant of a continuance is within the discretion of the Court, under the
circumstances of this case, it would be tantamount to an abuse of that discretion to deny the
Defendant's Motion to Continue. Furthermore, in this case, the Plaintiff cannot complain of
surprise or establish serious prejudice based on a continuance, whereas the denial of the
continuance will force the Defendant into an untenable situation of having to forego his right to
be heard at trial or forego his candidacy.
CONCLUSION
In this case, the Defendant has cooperated with the Plaintiff and his counsel's schedule
in all respects. The only thing more that the Defendant could do would be to simply abdicate
to the Plaintiff, which the Defendant is unwilling to do. The Plaintiff was fully aware of the

5

Defendant's unavailability when the Plaintiff insisted on setting an imminent trial date. To
permit the matter to go forward and force the Defendant into making a choice of giving up his
right to be heard at trial or giving up his candidacy, is manifestly unjust. There is no good
reason to permit the Plaintiff to force the Defendant into such a choice, whereas there is clearly
good cause to continue the trial date until after the Defendant's campaign is completed and his
political obligations are satisfied.
DATED this 5th day of April.

Janet A. Goldstein
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On the y
day of April, I certify that I caused to be served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Objection to Scheduling Order and Trial Setting
and Motion to Continue Trial Date, postage prepaid, by mailing same to the following:
H. James Clegg, Esq.
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FEHLAUER, C STEVEN
PLAINTIFF,
SCHEDULING ORDER AND
TRIAL NOTICE
-VSCASE NO.

930312024 CN

SCHWARTZ, THOMAS H
HONORABLE DAVID S YOUNG
DEFENDANT.
PURSUANT TO THE SCHEDULING CONFERENCE HELD ON 3-28-94
THE FOLLOWING DATES WERE SET AND MATTERS DISCUSSED:
1.
THIS CASE IS SET FOR TRIAL ON MAY 10, 1994 AT 9:00 A.M.
2.
ANTICIPATED TRIAL TIME IS 02 DAYS.
3.
THE CASE IS SET FOR NON JURY TRIAL
4.
ALL DISCOVERY INCLUDING RESPONSES MUST BE CONCLUDED BY
DONE _
5.
ALL DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS ARE TO BE HEARD BY
6.
EXHIBIT AND WITNESS LISTS ARE TO BE EXCHANGED BY
7.
A FINAL PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD ON
APRIL 26, 1994
AT 3:00 P .M. TRIAL COUNSEL AND CLIENTS, OR
AN INDIVIDUAL WITH AUTHORITY TO SETTLE THIS CASE ARE TO BE
PRESENT. OUT OF STATE PARTIES MUST BE AVAILABLE BY PHONE AT THE
TIME OF THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE.
8.
FAILURE TO APPEAR AT THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE
MAY RESULT IN A DEFAULT.
9.
THE FOREGOING DATES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FIRM SETTINGS
AND WILL NOT BE MODIFIED WITHOUT COURT ORDER, AND THEN ONLY
UPON A SHOWING OF MANIFEST INJUSTICE. COUNSEL ARE INSTRUCTED TO
STAY IN CONTACT WITH THE CLERK OF THIS COURT AS THE TRIAL DATE
APPROACHES REGARDING THE TRIAL SETTING.
10.
IF PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL ANTICIPATES THAT EVIDENCE AT TRIAL
WILL SHOW DAMAGES OF LESS THAN $20,000, COUNSEL SHOULD., <BRBBARE AN
ORDER TRANSFERRING THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT.
^.S D I S ^ S
11. OTHER MATTERS: IF RESOLVED IT IS TO BE SXF^]^T¥D''''T?£&.N

RECORD @ PRE-TRIAL OR HAVE SIGNED STIPULATION/ORDE$\FILED PRIOS^
DATED THIS 28TH DAY OF/MA"RCHv 1994.
^ / gijMWN' \ 0 \

DISTRICT COURT

s;£4;ov)MTV / - /

COPIES MAILED TO PARTIES AT THE ADDRESSES INDICATED ON 'SHE.*
ATTACHED MAILING CERTIFICATE.
'
,\;>xV

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I MAILED A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THE
ATTACHED SCHEDULING ORDER AND TRIAL NOTICE, BY FIRST CLASS MAIL,
POSTAGE PREPAID, TO THE FOLLOWING:

PAESTDN.SmNLEY
CLEGG, JAMES H.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
10 EXCHANGE PLACE, 11TH FLOOR
P. 0. BOX 45000
SALT LAKE CITY
UT 84145

DATED THIS— 3(L

DAY OF

^GOLDSTEIN, JANET A.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
DEER VALLEY PLAZA, STE 208
P 0 BOX 4556
PARK CITY
UT 84060

2n^AL
DEPUTY CLERK

19 fy

March 29, 1994

I hereby certify that Thomas H. Schwartz of 120 Orange Street,
Douglas, is a candidate for State Representative in the Special
State Primary on May 10th. After winning the primary, Mr.
Schwartz will then be a candidate in the Special State Election
on June 7th. If he wins this, he will have to attend sessions
in the House of Representative until they recess on July 11th.

A True Copy,

ATTEST:
McCallum
Town Clerk
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H. JAMES CLEGG (A0681)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Plaintiff
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
C. STEVEN FEHLAUER,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v.
THOMAS H. SCHWARTZ,

Civil No. 93*12024

Defendant.

This matter having come on regularly for trial at Coalville, Utah on May 10, 1994,
plaintiff being present and represented by his counsel, H. James Clegg, and defendant
being absent but represented specially by his counsel, Janet A. Goldstein, and Ms.
Goldstein having renewed defendant's motion for continuance of trial and such being
denied she objected to the trial's proceeding forward, invoked the exclusionary rule and
declined to participate further until plaintiff rested, at which time she renewed her
objection to die refusal to continue the trial setting, and die Court having heard evidence in
the form of testimony and exhibits and having received die deposition testimony of

defendant, having heard argument of plaintiffs counsel and being fully advised, the Court
now makes and enters its
FINDINGS OF FACT:
1.

This dispute involves 17.24 acres of real property, five shares of water stock

in West Hoytsville Irrigation Company and approximately 50 lengths of 40' sprinkler pipe
used in connection therewith near Hoytsville, Summit County, Utah. Generally speaking,
the property is located just soutii of 841 Soutii West Hoytsville Road; it is bounded on the
west by that improved road connecting Hoytsville and Wanship; on the east it crosses the
Weber River. It is more specifically described as:
A TRACT OF LAND LYING IN SECTION 20, TOWNSHIP 2 NORTH, RANGE 5 EAST,
SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN BEGINNING AT A POINT ON THE WEST LINE
OF PARCEL 1 AS DESCRIBED IN THAT CERTAIN WARRANTY DEED IN FAVOR OF
THOMAS H. SCHULTZ AND RECORDED IN BOOK 671 AT PAGE 21. SAID POINT
OF BEGINNING BEING MORE PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED AS BEGINNING AT A
POINT NORTH ALONG SECTION LINE 1451.01 FEET AND EAST 3790.64 FEET FROM
THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID SECTION 20, SAID POINT ALSO BEING ON
THE EASTERLY RIGHT-OF-WAY LINE OF A COUNTY ROAD; AND RUNNING
THENCE NORTH 89°27' EAST 1023.27 FEET TO A POINT ON AN EXISTING FENCE
LINE; THENCE ALONG SAID FENCE LINE THE FOLLOWING FOUR CALLS:
1)
2)
3)
4)

SOUTH
SOUTH
SOUTH
SOUTH

16°36' WEST 59.46 FEET; THENCE
23° 16'EAST 60.56 FEET; THENCE
26°43' EAST 178.13 FEET; THENCE
46°09' EAST 133.00 FEET;

THENCE NORTH 74°13'10" EAST 172.96 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 00°28' EAST 146.00
FEET; THENCE NORTH 84°27' EAST 72.60 FEET; MORE OR LESS, TO A POINT ON
THE EAST LINE OF SAID SECTION 20; THENCE SOUTH ALONG SAID SECTION
LINE 215.38 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 86°02'02" WEST 1240.53 FEET TO A POINT ON
THE EASTERLY RIGHT-OF-WAY OF THE AFOREMENTIONED COUNTY ROAD;
THENCE ALONG SAID EASTERLY RIGHT-OF-WAY THE FOLLOWING THREE
CALLS:
1)
2)
3)

NORTH 09°54'56" WEST 59.06 FEET; THENCE
NORTH 18°37'59" WEST 144.43 FEET; THENCE
NORTH 18°32'15" WEST 450.89 FEET
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TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING.

2.

There are four real estate transactions which are pertinent to the matter and

which are interrelated one to another:
A.

On July 1, 1992, defendant acquired approximately 24 acres, more or

less, (Parcel ABC), from Robert H. Williams and Joan H. Williams, giving a note secured
by trust deed for $200,000 and interest. A house and outbuildings are situated at the
northwest corner of ABC. The west side of ABC fronts on an improved road and a river
(Weber) runs through ABC on the east. A principal payment of $40,000, plus interest of
$16,000, was due July 1, 1993. Upon payment of that amount, the principal balance owed
Mr. and Mrs. Williams would be $160,000. The Williams/Schwartz (W/S) trust deed had
a due-on-sale clause.
Defendant decided to sell Parcel ABC and, on February 23, 1993, he listed it for
six months with Coldwell-Banker Premier Realtors' Park City Office (Coldwell). It was
multiple-listed and advertised both as a residential property and an agricultural property. It
did not sell quickly as a single parcel but a buyer named Madsen was interested in the
northern portion. She wished to purchase about 7 acres but, because of criteria of the
conventional-mortgage industry which discriminates against encumbrances where a large
proportion of value is in unimproved real estate, it was agreed that the portion desired by
Ms. Madsen would be further divided into a north parcel and a south parcel. Parcel A,
the northernmost, contains 3.89 acres, more or less, and includes the buildings.
Conventional financing was applied for. Offers on Utah Earnest Money Sales Agreement
3

forms dated May 15, 1993 were submitted to defendant by Ms. Madsen for both Parcel A
and Parcel B, discussed in the next paragraph.
B.

Parcel B, the other "Madsen" parcel, is irrigated hay or pasture land.

It contains 2.84 acres, more or less. The price for Parcel B was $15,000, of which
$13,000 was represented by a note secured by trust deed in favor of defendant. The 1-1/2
shares of water stock to be transferred by defendant to Ms. Madsen was "tied" to Parcel B
for defendant's security. Further, the two Schwartz/Madsen Earnest Money Sales
Agreements were tied together so that both had to be performed or neither could be. The
specified closing date for both contracts was July 1 so that the cash proceeds could be used
toward the due-on-sale clause of the W/S trust deed.
C.

This left Parcel C, the property involved in this suit. Defendant had

listed it at $120,000. The advertising was seen by plaintiff and his wife who desired to
build in a rural area to raise their young family. However, because of plaintiffs
professional commitments, it was necessary that they locate within driving distance of
University of Utah and Veterans' Administration hospitals in Salt Lake City. They
believed Parcel C to be ideal for their needs.
3.

At all times, defendant had made it clear to Coldwell that he would not sell

Parcel C unless Parcels A and B were first sold.
4.

Plaintiff made an offer of $115,000 on June 25, 1993, using the then-current

Utah Earnest Money Sales Agreement form. By use of fax machines, the common way of
handling the various negotiations in the Madsen and Fehlauer transactions, defendant
4

received it that day and insisted on the full listing price. On the addendum/counteroffer
form, defendant added paragraph 6: "Subject to sale of house & property located at 841
S. W. Hoytsville Rd, Coalville on or before July 6, 1993", the point which he later urged
to repudiate the transaction. This documentation is the Schwartz/Fehlauer (S/F) contract;
plaintiff requests a decree of specific performance.
5.

Plaintiff accepted the same day.

6.

With respect to paragraph 6, it was the understanding of plaintiff, his realtor

and the Coldwell agents that this language pertained to the prior known requirement that
the sale of Parcels A and B to Ms. Madsen must occur or Parcel C would not be sold; if
the Madsen sales fell through, defendant would not sell Parcel C.
7.

The materiality of the July 6 date is at issue. July 1 may have been a

material date: on that day, defendant was obliged to make his annual payment of $56,000
to Robert Williams; for that reason, July 1 was the scheduled closing date for the Madsen
sales. Because those sales did not close on or before July 1, defendant was required1 to
borrow $56,000 at a claimed cost to him of $16,000. [Part of the money came through an
I.R.A. transaction which might result in an early-withdrawal penalty; at the time of his
deposition, defendant did not know whether a penalty would be imposed or not.]

*By July 1, all of the property was contracted for sale and it is certainly possible,
perhaps likely in view of their other courtesies and accommodations to defendant, that Mr.
and Mrs. Williams would have extended the time for the annual payment until the other
transactions closed; the W/S note could then be paid off. Defendant did not make this
request, or even inquire, of the Williamses.
5

8.

As to July 6, defendant testified at deposition that he chose this date on June

25 because he feared the Madsen sales could not be closed on or before July 1 and this
extra five days might be needed.
9.

Defendant believed that the Madsen transactions would fail as a matter of

law if not closed by July 1, which he extended to July 6, and he could then put all three
parcels back on the market.
10.

The closing of Parcel A did not occur on or before July 6 because of

problems with Ms. Madsen's mortgage banker. While she had qualified as a borrower,
the comparables provided did not, in the banker's judgment, justify the sales price of
Parcel A. New comparables had to be found, which required several days. Ms. Madsen
was able to sign all documents (through her attorney-in-fact) on Friday, July 16, 1993.
11.

A standard printed provision, Paragraph Q, in the Utah Earnest Money Sales

Agreements executed by Ms. Madsen provided:
Time is of essence-Unavoidable delay. In the event that this sale cannot be
closed by the date provided herein due to interruption of transport, strikes,
fire, flood, extreme weather, governmental regulations, delays caused by
lender, acts of God, or similar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or
Seller, then the closing date shall be extended seven (7) [working] days
beyond cessation of such condition, but in no event more than fifteen (15)
days beyond the closing date [July 1] provided herein. Thereafter, time is of
the essence. This provision relates only to the extension of closing dates.
"Closing" shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments are signed
and delivered by all parties to the transaction.
12.

Defendant was unaware of, or did not think about, this provision set forth in

Paragraph Q until July 6 or shortly thereafter.
6

13.

At deposition, it was defendant's belief that he had the power to revoke the

Madsen transactions when they didn't close on July 1. While Paragraph Q may ordinarily
extend a land sales contract under circumstances of lender delay, there was no lender-delay
so far as Parcel B was concerned. Because defendant was the only lender on that
property, he reasoned that Paragraph Q didn't come into play. Since Parcel A could not
be purchased without concurrent purchase of Parcel B and Parcel B was in unexcused
default after July 1, defendant was arguably not obliged to proceed. However, he did
proceed.
14.

The net cash available to defendant from the Madsen sales would have been

insufficient to pay off Mr. and Mrs. Williams and, upon closing the Madsen transactions,
defendant would have to come up with some new money.
15.

At some point before July 1, Mr. and Mrs. Williams agreed with defendant

that they would not enforce the due-on-sale clause of the W/S trust deed but, instead,
would accept $80,000 in cash and take a new note and trust deed against Parcel C for the
remaining $80,000, giving defendant two additional years of financing, giving him some
cash from the Madsen sales and avoiding his injecting new money.
16.

As it turned out, following usual procedures for signing closing documents,

recording deeds and encumbrances and disbursing proceeds, defendant did not receive his
money from the Madsen sale until Tuesday, July 20.
17.

In the meantime, contrary to the wishes of defendant, Ms. Madsen took

possession of Parcels A and B. Defendant was furious because he had not received the
7

sales proceeds. He demanded that Ms. Madsen pay $500 per day for possession until he
received his money. When she agreed, he insisted that it be $1,000 per day, to which she
also acceded. He then demanded $2,000 per day. Defendant then called the Summit
County Sheriff to have Ms. Madsen removed; the Sheriff refused to do so but, on the
advice of the Summit County Attorney, he requested Ms. Madsen to secure the premises
with her belongings inside and remove her family pending disbursement of the funds,
which she did.
18.

Defendant blamed Coldwell for permitting this early possession; Coldwell

denied it had. Defendant filed a complaint with the Board of Realtors concerning the
handling of the transaction.
19.

Inasmuch as Mr. and Mrs. Williams had not received their $80,000 as

agreed on July 1, Old Republic Title Insurance company of Utah, Inc. (Old Republic), the
title company charged with closing the transaction and disbursing the funds, sought to pay
them $333.07 as interest for the delayed payment. Defendant, while in the title company's
lobby, became loud, irate and belligerent, threatening to sue Coldwell and Old Republic.
To stop this unfortunate scene, Old Republic refunded the $333.07 to defendant, reducing
its own charges by that amount.
20. By its terms, the S/F contract was to close on August 13, 1993. On August 9,
Old Republic sent, by Federal Express, the seller's closing documents to defendant in
Massachusetts for signature, notarization and return.
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21.

On August 11, two days before the closing date, plaintiff paid $120,000 cash

to Old Republic. Plaintiff and his wife appeared at the title company on that day and
signed all documents required of them.
22.

Thoroughly angered, and with his own re-financing of Parcel B secure,

defendant refused to honor the S/F contract and never signed or returned the closing
documents. Instead, he sent them, unsigned, to his attorney after this litigation
commenced.
23.

Plaintiff did everything required of him to purchase Parcel C on or before

the time required for his performance; further, plaintiff relied on the acquisition of the
property and, to service his own debt in connection therewith, he contracted with the
Veterans' Administration to provide medical care at the V.A. Hospital in Helena,
Montana. To do so, he must provide weekend services at the hospital in Helena from
Friday night to Monday morning, save four hours. This has required as many as three
weekends per month but has now stabilized at every-third-weekend. This extra work is a
hardship on him and his family and illustrates the plaintiffs desire to acquire and enjoy
Parcel C.
24.

The only "time is of the essence" provision in the S/F contract relates to

events following the closing date, not one preceding it such as Ms. Madsen's failure to
close on or before July 6.
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25.

There is no evidence that closing of the Madsen agreements by July 6 was

particularly material or important as a ,fdrop-dead date" for the S/F contract; it was only
material that the Madsen transactions first close, which they did.
26.

The $120,000 paid by plaintiff remains on deposit, at interest, with Old

Republic.
27.

The S/F contract provides for recovery of costs and reasonable attorneys'

fees from the party in breach.
28.

It was reasonable and necessary for plaintiff to engage the assistance of

counsel in petitioning for and obtaining relief from this Court; attorneys' fees of
$10,263.75 has been earned and is appropriate and reasonable.
29. The S/F contract terms include payment of scheduled closing costs and real
estate commissions and provided that marketable tide will be conveyed to the buyer; in this
instance, marketable title requires the W/S trust deed to be cleared.
30.

Plaintiff has been out of possession of the property since August 13, 1993

and has received no damages, interest or rental; he has had to pay interest on his own debt
in order to maintain his tender of performance.
Having made these Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters its
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
1.

It is appropriate to receive and consider extrinsic or parol evidence when

analyzing the materiality of a contract term.

10

2.

This is especially true in an equity case for specific performance of a land

sales contract.
3.

Time of performance may be analyzed for materiality; this is particularly

true when there is no applicable "time is of the essence" provision.
4.

Under the facts and circumstances of this transaction, the closing of the

Madsen contracts by July 6 was not a material term of the S/F contract so long as those
contracts were actually closed within a reasonable time after July 6, which they were.
5.

Alternatively, and as an independent ground for relief, the extension of the

Madsen closing date for 15 days, from July 1 to July 16 extended the July 6 provision of
the addendum/counterclaim of the S/F contract for the same number of days, to July 21,
1993. Ms. Madsen had closed before that date so the S/F contract remained viable.
6.

Alternatively, and as another independent ground for relief, by its equity

jurisdiction the Court can reform paragraph 6 of the counteroffer/addendum to read as was
understood and intended: "Subject to sale of house & property located at 841 S. W.
Hoytsville Rd, Coalville to Nancy Madsen pursuant to agreements already in place."
7.

Plaintiff performed all things required of him on or before the date required.

8.

Defendant breached his contract to convey Parcel C without justification.

9.

The Court has jurisdiction and authority in equity to compel specific

performance of the S/F contract according to its terms and should do so in light of the law
and the evidence.

11

10.

Plaintiffs counsel is entitled, as provided in the S/F contract, to recover a

reasonable fee and costs for assisting plaintiff in obtaining relief from defendant's breach.
11.

The sum on deposit at Old Republic is available to the Court to specifically

enforce performance of the S/F contract and for payment of attorneys' fees and costs.
12.

The interest incurred on the sum deposited with Old Republic should be paid

to plaintiff in partial reimbursement of loss of use of the property and the interest cost of
maintaining his tender of performance.
DATED this /&^flay o f ^ ^ 1 9 9 4 .
BY THE COURT:

JuSg^sTTW^i
•n06:gpm\work\hjc\fehJauer\findings.con

"****——•^

H \
%

12

- /

<r

~CC-

COUNTV
"•

^

-v;
^

Tab 4

No.

H. JAMES CLEGG (A0681)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Plaintiff
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

JU'i
*-..

10 -oc.j
^""nmrt

C(J|
0|

A^3f

""y

°*^'QW

m^u

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
C. STEVEN FEHLAUER,
Plaintiff,
v.

JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND
RELATED ORDERS

THOMAS H. SCHWARTZ,
Civil No. 93*12024
Defendant.

Having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court
makes and enters its judgment, decree of specific performance and related orders:
1.

Plaintiff is entitled to, and is hereby awarded, specific performance of die

Schwartz/Fehlauer (S/F) Earnest Money Sales Agreement of June 25, 1993 upon the
ground and for the reason mat all material terms and conditions of the agreement were
timely met.
2.

As an alternative and independent ground, the S/F agreement should be, and

hereby is, reformed so mat paragraph 6 of the Counteroffer reads as follows: "Subject to

sale of house & property located at 841 S. W. Hoytsville Rd, Coalville to Nancy Madsen
pursuant to agreements already in place." With that reformation, all terms and conditions
of the agreement were met.
3.

As another alternative and independent ground, the July 6, 1993 reference in

the addendum/counteroffer was extended fifteen days to and until July 21 in conformity
with the extension of closing of the Madsen/Schwartz agreements, and all terms and
conditions of the S/F agreement were met.
4.

From the funds it holds on deposit, plaintiff shall record with the Summit

County Recorder a certified copy of this Decree upon its entry and filing with the Clerk of
the Court.
5.

Unless stayed by this Court or an appellate court of appropriate jurisdiction,

with such supersedeas bond as is appropriate, it is ordered and decreed upon such
recording with the Summit County Recorder, marketable title to the following described
real property shall immediately and without further acts or instruments, vest in C. Steven
Fehlauer and Roxanne D. Fehlauer, his wife, as joint tenants and not as tenants in
common, and they shall be entitled to immediate possession of said real property:
A TRACT OF LAND LYING IN SECTION 20, TOWNSHIP 2 NORTH, RANGE 5 EAST,
SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN BEGINNING AT A POINT ON THE WEST LINE
OF PARCEL 1 AS DESCRIBED IN THAT CERTAIN WARRANTY DEED IN FAVOR OF
THOMAS H. SCHULTZ AND RECORDED IN BOOK 671 AT PAGE 21. SAID POINT
OF BEGINNING BEING MORE PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED AS BEGINNING AT A
POINT NORTH ALONG SECTION LINE 1451.01 FEET AND EAST 3790.64 FEET FROM
THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID SECTION 20, SAID POINT ALSO BEING ON
THE EASTERLY RIGHT-OF-WAY LINE OF A COUNTY ROAD; AND RUNNING
THENCE NORTH 89°27' EAST 1023.27 FEET TO A POINT ON AN EXISTING FENCE
LINE; THENCE ALONG SAID FENCE LINE THE FOLLOWING FOUR CALLS:

2
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1)
2)
3)
4)

SOUTH
SOUTH
SOUTH
SOUTH

16°36'
23° 16'
26°43'
46°09*

WEST 59.46 FEET; THENCE
EAST 60.56 FEET; THENCE
EAST 178.13 FEET; THENCE
EAST 133.00 FEET;

THENCE NORTH 74° 13'10" EAST 172.96 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 00°28' EAST 146.00
FEET; THENCE NORTH 84°27' EAST 72.60 FEET; MORE OR LESS, TO A POINT ON
THE EAST LINE OF SAID SECTION 20; THENCE SOUTH ALONG SAID SECTION
LINE 215.38 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 86°02'02" WEST 1240.53 FEET TO A POINT ON
THE EASTERLY RIGHT-OF-WAY OF THE AFOREMENTIONED COUNTY ROAD;
THENCE ALONG SAID EASTERLY RIGHT-OF-WAY THE FOLLOWING THREE
CALLS:
1)
2)
3)

NORTH 09°54'56" WEST 59.06 FEET; THENCE
NORTH 18°37'59"" WEST 144.43 FEET; THENCE
NORTH 18°32'15" WEST 450.89 FEET

TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING.

6.

Old Republic Title Insurance Company of Utah, Inc, (Old Republic) is

hereby ordered to pay off all liens and encumbrances of record against Parcel C, including
all sums, together with interest to date of disbursement, owed Mr. and Mrs. Robert
Williams. Real property taxes shall be paid, prorated if necessary to the date hereof. If
there are any reasons marketable title is not available to plaintiff at that point, Old
Republic shall notify plaintiffs counsel and he shall notify the Court.
7.

Upon notice from plaintiffs counsel to so do, Old Republic is also ordered

to pay delinquent assessments, if any, owed West Hoytsville Irrigation Company for the
five shares of irrigation water involved in the S/F transaction; counsel shall file with the
Clerk of the Court a written certificate showing the delinquent amount and its calculation.
8.

Plaintiff shall ascertain whether the requisite 50 lengths of irrigation

sprinkler pipe are physically present on Parcel C, or otherwise available to him, in as good
condition as on August 11, 1993, reasonable wear and tear excepted. If it is, he shall file
3
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his certificate so stating with the Clerk of this Court for inclusion in this record. If it is
not, plaintiff shall advise his counsel of the particulars and he shall notify the Court.
9.

West Hoytsville Irrigation Company is hereby ordered to transfer and deliver

five shares of water stock from defendant's account to plaintiff upon service of a certified
copy of this Judgment and Decree to the managing agent of said water company; it shall
not refuse to do so based upon delinquent assessments inasmuch as provision therefor is
made, supra.
10.

From the sums remaining on deposit after payment of the aforesaid sums,

Old Republic is ordered to pay the scheduled closing costs, including tide insurance costs
and realtors' commissions as set forth on the proffered settlement documents. In addition,
it shall pay to itself such extra costs in reasonable amount as are made necessary by
defendant's failure to close on August 11, 1993, which shall include die administrative cost
of accountings, disbursements and certificates made necessary by these orders.
11.

Old Republic is further ordered to pay from the sums on deposit an

attorneys' fee of $10,263.75 to Snow, Christensen and Martineau, which shall include outof-pocket expenses of $265.86 and taxable court costs of $505.20.
12.

Old Republic is further ordered to pay to plaintiff all interest accrued on the

escrowed sum as he has been out-of-possession of the real property during the time the
interest was earned.
13.

When all of the foregoing is accomplished, Old Republic is ordered to pay

any sum remaining on deposit over to defendant.
4
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14.

Old Republic shall then file with the Clerk of this Court, referencing this

matter by name and civil number, its accounting for sums distributed and its certificate that
it has carried out these orders insofar as they are directed to Old Republic.
DATED this

fe^day

ofJftyTW.
BY THE COURT:
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